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Abstract
When implementing an investment projects a problem of produc-
tion facilities location with taking into account the environmental pol-
lution arises. A mathematical model of the industrial enterprises loca-
tion in the region is formalized and studied in this paper. It is necessary
to locate objects polluting the environment in such way as to maximize
the total income of the players. The total income is calculated as in-
come from the activities of enterprises, minus the funds that are spent
on the recover damage to the environment. This problem is formalized
as a non-cooperative game with n players that exploit common sources
– natural objects. Numerical example is solved.
1 Introduction
Let us define a Cartesian coordinate system. The axis OX is directed to the
east, the axis OY is directed strictly to the north. In the region under consid-
eration there are natural objects A1, . . . , Am. Each object is characterized
by a pair of coordinates (xj , yj). Participants in the competitive process
are objects: ”pollutants” B1, . . . , Bn and ”contaminated” A1, . . . , Am. The
number of players is n, and the number of natural objects is m.
The basics of the approaches and methodologies applied here can also
be seen in [1-50].
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2 Main results
The set of the player i strategies :
Di = [ui = (xi, yi), ρ ≤
√
(xi − xj)2 + (yi − yj)2 ≤ ρ,∀j ∈ m, j 6= i], i ∈ n
0 ≤ xi ≤ xmax, 0 ≤ yi ≤ ymax.
where ρ(ρ) – is the minimum (maximum) distance between objects.
For each players strategy profile the players payoff functions are defined.
The income of the player is equal to the value of its payoff function.
Let us take the income function for the i player as follows:
Hi(u) =
m∑
j=1,j 6=i
Lij
ρ(i, j)
−
m∑
j=1,j 6=i
QijWi
2piρ2(i, j)
, i = 1, n, (1)
where n is the number of players, m is the number of natural objects;
ρ(i, j) =
√
(xi − xj)2 + (yi − yj)2 is the distance between the industrial en-
terprise i and the natural object j.
The income from the activity of the enterprise i, received by the player
i is:
Lij
ρ(i, j)
, (2)
where Lij ≥ 0 is the amount of the loss, depending on the distance ρ(i, j)
between the objects i and j. The greater the distance between the enterprise
and the natural object, the lower of the income amount of the i player will
receive.
The amount of resources that the player i spends on compensating for
environmental damage to the natural object j:
QijWi
2piρ2(i, j)
. (3)
Qij is the weighting factor. It defines environmental damage that object i
causes to object j, Wi is the amount of harmful substances that the object
i emits into the environment.
If the object i does not harm the object j, then Qij = 0.
The function Hi(u) in the domain of (ρ ≤
√
(xi − xj)2 + (yi − yj)2 ≤ ρ)
is continuous and has partial derivatives of the first and second order that
are continuous in this region. Hence, it is smooth in the domain of the job.
3 Numerical example
Let’s consider a numerical example.
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A noncooperative game G = (N, {Xi}i∈N , {Hi}i∈N ) is considered where
N = 3 is the number of players, Xi is the set of player i strategies, Hi is
the player i payoff function. Let the number of natural objects be m = 5.
Let the region has an area of 15 square kilometers. We set pi = 3. Let the
natural objects A1, A2, A3, A4, A5 in the region be arranged as follows:
Table 1: Location of natural objects.
Natural objects A1 A2 A3 A4 A5
Coordinate x 2 5 9 14 8
Coordinate y 3 9 6 1 13
For the enterprise of each player there is a permissible set of points
where it is possible to build it, that is, each player i has an acceptable set
of strategies:
Table 2: Admissible positions (B1, B2, B3) for placing the company’s player
1.
Industrial enterprise 1 B1 B2 B3
Coordinate x 7 1 9
Coordinate y 8 2 10
Table 3: Admissible positions (C1, C2, C3, C4) for placing the company’s
player 2.
Industrial enterprise 2 C1 C2 C3 C4
Coordinate x 6 11 5 8
Coordinate y 4 15 3 15
Table 4: Admissible positions (D1,D2) for placing the company’s player 3.
Industrial enterprise 3 D1 D2
Coordinate x 4 6
Coordinate y 12 1
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Table 5: The amount of loss Lij of player 1.
Industrial enterprise 1 B1 B2 B3
Natural object A1 10 1 13
Natural object A2 4 11 8
Natural object A3 5 12 6
Natural object A4 13 15 14
Natural object A5 9 15 6
Table 6: The amount of loss Lij of player 2.
Industrial enterprise 2 C1 C2 C3 C4
Natural object A1 5 17 2 15
Natural object A2 7 10 8 9
Natural object A3 4 13 6 12
Natural object A4 11 16 13 18
Natural object A5 13 3 14 1
Table 7: The amount of loss Lij of player 3.
Industrial enterprise 3 D1 D2
Natural object A1 8 3
Natural object A2 1 7
Natural object A3 5 4
Natural object A4 10 6
Natural object A5 2 9
Table 8: The weighting coefficient Qij, which determines the environmental
damage caused by an industrial enterprise 1 to natural object j.
Industrial enterprise 1 B1 B2 B3
Natural object A1 1.15 2.75 1.45
Natural object A2 1.5 1.95 2.15
Natural object A3 1 1.15 1.05
Natural object A4 2.2 1.8 2.9
Natural object A5 1.9 2.6 1.4
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Table 9: The weighting coefficient Qij, which determines the environmental
damage for player 2.
Industrial enterprise 2 C1 C2 C3 C4
Natural object A1 2.4 1.96 1.34 2.05
Natural object A2 1.67 1.02 1.73 1.09
Natural object A3 2.45 1.75 1 2.05
Natural object A4 1.85 2.3 1.6 1.31
Natural object A5 1.1 2.7 1.32 1.09
Table 10: The weighting coefficient Qij , which determines the environmen-
tal damage for player 3.
Industrial enterprise 3 D1 D2
Natural object A1 2.9 1.25
Natural object A2 1.05 1.64
Natural object A3 2.1 1.36
Natural object A4 1.9 1.82
Natural object A5 1.08 1.6
Table 11: Amount of harmful substances Wi, discarded enterprise i to fa-
vorites
Industrial enterprise 1 60
Industrial enterprise 2 15
Industrial enterprise 3 35
Table 12: The influence of the choice of strategies of players 2 and 3 on the
income of the player 1, when using 1 strategy.
Player positions 3/Player positions 2 C1 C2 C3 C4
D1 0.17 0.89 0.25 0.32
D2 1.01 1.82 1.54 1.76
We calculate the value of the payoff function of each player according to
the formula (1) taking into account the data specified above. We get the
following payoff matrices for players 1, 2 and 3, where the lines are player’s
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Table 13: The influence of the choice of strategies of players 2 and 3 on the
income of the player 1, when using 2 strategy.
Player positions 3/Player positions 2 C1 C2 C3 C4
D1 1.54 1.82 1.01 1.76
D2 0.25 0.89 0.17 0.32
Table 14: The influence of the choice of strategies of players 2 and 3 on the
income of the player 1, when using 3 strategy.
Player positions 3/Player positions 2 C1 C2 C3 C4
D1 0.32 0.25 0.89 0.17
D2 1.76 1.54 1.82 1.01
Table 15: The influence of the choice of strategies of players 1 and 3 on the
income of the player 2, when using 1 strategy
Player positions 3/Player positions 1 B1 B2 B3
D1 0.74 0.85 0.96
D2 0.32 0.46 0.57
Table 16: The influence of the choice of strategies of players 1 and 3 on the
income of the player 2, when using 2 strategy.
Player positions 3/Player positions 1 B1 B2 B3
D1 0.46 0.57 0.32
D2 0.85 0.96 0.74
Table 17: The influence of the choice of strategies of players 1 and 3 on the
income of the player 2, when using 3 strategy.
Player positions 3/Player positions 1 B1 B2 B3
D1 0.85 0.74 0.96
D2 0.46 0.32 0.57
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Table 18: The influence of the choice of strategies of players 1 and 3 on the
income of the player 2, when using 4 strategy.
Player positions 3/Player positions 1 B1 B2 B3
D1 0.46 0.57 0.32
D2 0.85 0.96 0.74
Table 19: The influence of the choice of strategies of players 1 and 2 on the
income of the player 3, when using 1 strategy.
Player positions 1/Player positions 2 C1 C2 C3 C4
B1 0.65 0.45 0.74 0.12
B2 1.63 1.6 1.7 1.5
B3 1.25 0.96 1.32 0.8
Table 20: The influence of the choice of strategies of players 1 and 2 on the
income of the player 3, when using 2 strategy.
Player positions 1/Player positions 2 C1 C2 C3 C4
B1 0.45 0.74 0.12 0.65
B2 0.96 1.32 0.8 1.25
B3 1.6 1.7 1.5 1.63
strategy 1, the columns are the strategies of player 2, the matrices are the
strategies of player 3:


(0.444; 3.931; 1.007) (2.326; 2.565; 0.186) (0.654; 4.220; 2.633) (0.836; 3.759; 1.487)
(5.339; 4.515; 0.697) (6.309; 3.178; 2.525) (3.501; 3.674; 2.323) (6.101; 4.658; 2.044)
(1.154; 5.100; 1.146) (0.902; 1.784; 2.478) (3.210; 4.766; 1.936) (0.613; 2.615; 1.239)




(2.640; 1.700; 1.201) (4.757; 4.739; 1.735) (4.025; 2.284; 2.135) (4.600; 6.946; 4.537)
(0.867; 2.444; 1.975) (3.085; 5.352; 2.562) (0.589; 1.589; 3.336) (1.109; 7.845; 4.003)
(6.348; 3.028; 0.320) (5.554; 4.126; 3.523) (6.564; 2.830; 4.270) (3.643; 6.047; 4.350)


3.1 The Nash Equilibrium
In the book [2] it is presented the construction of the Nash equilibrium
strategy profile. Since in our problem each of the three players has a finite
number of strategies, and each competitive strategy profile corresponds to
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the set of the income functions values of the players, then in this game there
is at least one Nash equilibrium strategy profile in the mixed strategies. Let
us find the equilibrium strategy profile in this example. Let us recall the
definition of the equilibrium strategy profile.
Definition A set of the strategies u∗ = (u∗1, . . . , u
∗
k), (u
∗
i ) ∈ Di is called a
Nash equilibrium strategy profile if for any strategy ui ∈ Di the following
inequality is valid
Hi(u
∗) ≥ Hi(u
∗||ui), i = 1, k, (4)
where (u∗||ui) = (u
∗
1, . . . , u
∗
i−1, u
∗
i+1, . . . , u
∗
k).
From the definition of equilibrium it follows that an agent i one-sided
deviation can only lead to a decrease in his income.
In this problem, the Nash equilibrium strategy profile is searched as
follows: in the first step let us fix the strategy 1 of player 2 (column 1) and
strategy 1 of player 3 (matrix 1). Then let us go through all the values
(three) of the payoff function of player 1 and choose the largest of them.
In the second step let us fix strategy 2 of player 2 (column 2) and strategy
1 of player 3 (matrix 1). Similarly, let us find the largest value of the payoff
function of player 1.
Thus, fixing the strategies of 2 and 3 players, let us find the greatest
value of the payoff function of the player 1 in each column of each matrix.
After that let us search the largest value of the payoff function of player
2. Let us fix player’s strategy 3 (matrix) and player’s strategy 1 (fixed-
matrix string). Further let us compare the values player’s payoff function
2 (on matrix columns). Let us find the largest value in each row of both
matrices.
Similarly, by fixing the strategies of player 1 (row) and player 2 (column)
let us choose the largest value of the payoff function of player 3 by its two
strategies (matrices).
Finally, let us examine the intersection of the chosen win values for each
player. This is the Nash equilibrium strategy profile.
Following this algorithm, let us obtain the following Nash equilibrium
point: (4.600; 6.946; 4.537).
3.2 A compromise strategy profile
Let us find a compromise strategy profile in this problem. The set of com-
promise strategies profile Mi = max{Hi(u), u ∈ D} is defined as follows:
Ck = {u ∈ D|max
i
(Mi −Hi(u
′
)) ≤ max
i
(Mi −Hi(u)),∀u ∈ D}.
In other words, a compromise strategy profile is a strategy profile in
which the largest deviation of the payoff function of one of the players from
its maximum value for i is not greater than the largest deviation of the i
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payoff function to one of the players from the maximum value in any other
strategy profile.
The compromise strategy profile is searched as follows in this problem:
for each player let us find the maximum value of its payoff function Mi:
M1 = 6.564;M2 = 7.845;M3 = 4.537. (5)
Thus, the ideal vector is (M1,M2,M3) = (6.564, 7.845, 4.537).
Let us calculate the maximum values of the residuals for each strategy
profile x ∈ X = B ∗ C ∗D. Here |X| = 3 ∗ 4 ∗ 2 = 24. Now let us calculate
x ∈ X maximum residual value δ(x):
(B1, C1,D1) : δ(1) =M1 −H1(1) = 6.12; (6)
(B1, C2,D1) : δ(2) =M2 −H2(2) = 5.28; (7)
(B1, C3,D1) : δ(3) =M1 −H1(1) = 5.91; (8)
(B1, C4,D1) : δ(4) =M1 −H1(1) = 5.728; (9)
(B2, C1,D1) : δ(5) =M3 −H3(1) = 3.837; (10)
(B2, C2,D1) : δ(6) =M2 −H2(2) = 4.667; (11)
(B2, C3,D1) : δ(7) =M2 −H2(3) = 4.171; (12)
(B2, C4,D1) : δ(8) =M2 −H2(4) = 3.187; (13)
(B3, C1,D1) : δ(9) =M1 −H1(3) = 5.41; (14)
(B3, C2,D1) : δ(10) =M2 −H2(2) = 6.061; (15)
(B3, C3,D1) : δ(11) =M1 −H1(3) = 3.354; (16)
(B3, C4,D1) : δ(12) =M1 −H1(3) = 5.951; (17)
(B1, C1,D2) : δ(13) =M2 −H2(1) = 6.145; (18)
(B1, C2,D2) : δ(14) =M2 −H2(2) = 3.106; (19)
(B1, C3,D2) : δ(15) =M2 −H2(3) = 5.561; (20)
(B1, C4,D2) : δ(16) =M1 −H1(1) = 1.964; (21)
(B2, C1,D2) : δ(17) =M1 −H1(2) = 5.697; (22)
(B2, C2,D2) : δ(18) =M1 −H1(2) = 3.479; (23)
(B2, C3,D2) : δ(19) =M2 −H2(3) = 6.256; (24)
(B2, C4,D2) : δ(20) =M1 −H1(2) = 5.455; (25)
(B3, C1,D2) : δ(21) =M2 −H2(1) = 4.817; (26)
(B3, C2,D2) : δ(22) =M2 −H2(2) = 3.719; (27)
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(B3, C3,D2) : δ(23) =M2 −H2(3) = 5.015; (28)
(B3, C4,D2) : δ(24) =M1 −H1(3) = 2.921; (29)
Among them, let us find the minimum value (maximal discrepancy) for all
strategies profile x ∈ X:
(B1, C4,D2) : δ(16) =M1 −H1(1) = 1.964, (30)
that is, the desired compromise strategy profile is the strategy profile (B1, C4,D2).
The values of the players winning features in this strategy profile are the
following (4.600; 6.946; 4.537).
4 Conclusion
The two principles of optimality, Nash equilibrium and compromise solution,
are considered in this paper. The compromise solution in the model is the
strategy profile (B1, C4,D2).
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